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Abstract 
In addition to internal R&D, external knowledge is widely considered as an essential lever for innovative 
performance. This paper analyzes knowledge spillovers in supply chain networks. Specifically, we 
investigate how supplier innovation is impacted by buyer innovation. Financial accounting data is 
combined with supply chain relationship data and patent data for U.S. firms in high tech industries. Our 
econometric analysis shows that buyer innovation has a positive and significant impact on supplier 
innovation. We find that the duration of the buyer-supplier relationship positively moderates this effect, 
but that the technological proximity between the two firms does not have a significant effect on 
spillovers. 
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1  Introduction 
Innovation has long been regarded as playing a key role in the competitive advantage and survival of 
firms (Audretsch, 1995; Cefis and Marsili, 2006; Schumpeter, 1942). To innovate, firms can invest in 
internal R&D or leverage external sources of knowledge. Such external knowledge can be exchanged 
via spillovers, collaborations, or direct market transactions such as technology licensing. Because of the 
complexity, uncertainty, and costs of the innovation process, firms are increasingly actively searching 
for external knowledge that is complementary to in-house R&D activities (Cohen et al., 2002; 
Chesbrough, 2003). With regard to particular sources, firms can benefit from the innovative activities 
of competing firms, academic institutions, and supply chain partners. Correspondingly, survey evidence 
suggests that downstream partners are an important information source for innovation (Cohen et al., 
2002; Belderbos et al., 2004). 
 In response to the practical importance of external knowledge and downstream partners in firm 
innovation, various streams of the management and applied economics literature provide related 
insights. A comprehensive body of studies has quantified the impact of inter-firm knowledge spillovers 
on firm innovation, traditionally focusing on unintentional knowledge transfers between rival firms 
(Jaffe 1986; Bloom et al. 2013). Similarly, research on multinational firms and foreign direct investment 
has examined technology and productivity spillovers from foreign investors to local firms (Almeida, 
1996; Görg and Strobl, 2001; Javorcik, 2004). Also, a distinct body of studies has investigated the role 
of downstream users as a valuable source in firms’ innovation processes (von Hippel, 1976; Chatterji 
and Fabrizio, 2012). Finally, the operations management literature has explored how new product 
development can be improved by leveraging supplier innovation through integration and collaboration 
(Primo and Amundson, 2002; Azadegan and Dooley, 2010).  
Despite the abovementioned research on knowledge spillovers, external sources of knowledge, and 
supply chain relationships, we propose that combining several perspectives in one study offers new and 
valuable insights. In particular, our study investigates (i) the impact of buyer innovation on supplier 
innovation with a focus on (ii) technological innovation as reflected by patents (iii) using a quantitative 
empirical design with information on direct linkages between suppliers and buyers. Besides 
documenting the prevalence and magnitude of knowledge spillovers, we also provide insights into 
drivers of heterogeneity across firms. One specific characteristic of a buyer-supplier relationship is the 
typically high frequency of interactions between the companies, which may increase spillovers over 
time. Thus, we consider relationship duration as a moderating determinant for the impact of buyer 
innovation on supplier innovation. Furthermore, the role of technological proximity as a moderating 
factor may differ in the supply chain context compared with that of competing firms.  
Knowledge spillovers are often referred to as informal, unintentional and uncompensated transfers 
of knowledge. However, the innovation literature also routinely speaks of voluntary, intentional 
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knowledge spillovers (De Jong and von Hippel, 2009) and strategic spillovers (Harhoff, 1996). In this 
paper we do not attempt to distinguish between intentional and unintentional knowledge spillovers and 
adopt a broader definition encompassing both. The empirical analysis relies on firm-level information 
for publicly traded American firms in high-technology sectors between 1990 and 2006. This information 
is combined with data on buyer-supplier linkages which is disclosed due to a financial accounting 
standard. Innovative output is proxied by patent data, which is extracted from the World Statistical 
Patent database (Patstat). Our sample contains 706 supplier-year observations, with at least one 
observed buying firm per supplier.  
By observing direct linkages between supply chain partners we document a positive effect of buyer 
innovation on supplier innovation. This result suggests that spillovers are also relevant in the context of 
supply-chain relationships and therefore complements findings about the positive impact of external 
knowledge on firms’ inventive performance in studies on R&D spillovers and open innovation. 
However, the relationship is largely conditional on the duration of the buyer-supplier relationship since, 
interestingly, there is no evidence of spillovers in newly formed supply chain partnerships. This has 
novel and interesting implications for both research and practice. Moreover, we find no evidence that 
knowledge spillovers increase with technological proximity between the supplying and buying firms, 
which is unexpected since proximity is typically associated with positive benefits for learning (see 
Orlando 2004).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the most relevant 
literature. In Section 3, the hypotheses are developed. In Section 4, the research methodology and data 
are presented. The econometric results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Robustness tests and 
post-hoc analysis are shown in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.  
 
2  Literature review 
The impact of external knowledge on firm innovation in general, and knowledge flows between supply 
chain partners in particular, has received considerable attention from several streams of academic 
literature. The most relevant literature for our study originates from the research areas of R&D spillovers 
(including related studies on spillovers from firms’ foreign direct investment), open and user innovation, 
and operations management.    
It has been shown that knowledge spillovers lead to an increase in companies’ R&D investments 
and higher innovation output and productivity (Jaffe et al., 1993; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Bloom et 
al., 2013). The impact of knowledge spillovers on firms’ innovation productivity is amplified by 
technological (Orlando, 2004) and spatial proximity between a firm and its competitors (Jaffe et al., 
1993; Lychagin et al., 2010; Mairesse and Mulkay, 2008; Aldieri and Cincera, 2009). Using plant-level 
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data, Ikeuchi et al. (2015) find that flows of technological knowledge originating from buyers increase 
the total factor productivity of suppliers.  
Related to geographic proximity, studies on foreign direct investments, international business, and 
R&D offshoring explain firms’ location choices in order to benefit from productivity and knowledge 
spillovers from proximate firms (e.g. Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Alcacer and Chung, 2007). The majority 
of the empirical studies suggest, directly or indirectly, that the buyer-supplier relationship is an important 
channel through which productivity spillovers occur. Local productivity improvements are considered 
to be a sign of learning from foreign investors (Almeida, 1996; Görg and Strobl, 2001; Havranek and 
Irsova, 2011; Javorcik, 2004; Meyer and Sinani, 2009) and trade (Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Saliola 
and Zanfei, 2009; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Although these studies indirectly point to business transactions 
as important enablers for knowledge transfer, they cannot observe direct supply chain linkages between 
firms.  
The importance of leveraging external knowledge sources is highlighted by studies on open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Dahlander and Gann, 2010) and user 
innovation (von Hippel, 1976; De Jong and von Hippel, 2009). Numerous case studies illustrate external 
knowledge as a crucial input for firms’ inventive activities. Specifically with regard to users, the most 
prominent examples are open source software development and the medical instruments sector. User 
developers contribute actively to the creation of new software, and clinicians co-develop new surgery 
tools jointly with companies (e.g. von Hippel et al., 1999; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Jeppesen 
and Frederiksen, 2006). Because of the difficulties of obtaining large-scale data on firms’ interactions 
with users, the majority of studies rely on qualitative information, with some notable exceptions.  
Using data from the community innovation survey (CIS), Laursen and Salter (2006) show that firms 
that access a broader range of external knowledge sources (e.g. universities, competitors, and customers) 
and use them more deeply increase their innovation productivity. Belderbos et al. (2004) document that, 
among other partners, spillovers from customers (including both firm and end customers) may facilitate 
the creation of radical innovation. With a focus on user innovation, Chatterji and Fabrizio (2012) show 
that medical instrument firms can improve their patent productivity by interacting with clinicians.1 
While the user innovation literature acknowledges companies as a user group (intermediate users), the 
main focus is on the end users of the products and equipment providers, limiting the generalizability of 
the findings with regard to spillovers of technological knowledge in a supply chain context.  
In the operations management literature, the supply chain is a common level of analysis. The effect 
of supplier involvement in new product development, with focus on project-related outcome dimensions 
such as project development times, project costs, product quality, and team effectiveness, has been 
                                                          
1
 Clinicians are an ambiguous user group, since the leading clinicians in university hospitals can also 
be regarded as university researchers. 
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investigated by conducting case studies and surveys (Primo and Amundson, 2002; Appleyard, 2003; 
Petersen, et al. 2005; Azadegan and Dooley, 2010). The majority of studies suggest that supplier 
involvement and collaboration has a positive impact on new product development. However, this line 
of research has little emphasis on technological innovations and R&D.  
 
 
3 Technological spillovers in supply chains 
3.1 Buying firms as a source of valuable knowledge for innovation 
Firms increasingly leverage external sources of knowledge because of the complexity and costs of the 
innovation process (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Compared with “traditional” horizontal R&D spillovers 
between rival firms, transactions between a buyer and a supplier can act as an additional channel for 
knowledge diffusion, whereby interactions at the individual level may facilitate the transfer of tacit 
knowledge (Feldman, 1999; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2001; Cowan et al., 2000). In a supply chain 
setting, incentives to share knowledge are also greater because of a certain mutual dependence and 
reduced product-market competition. One would hence expect the innovative output of a firm to be 
positively influenced by the innovativeness of its buyers. Conversely, in high-technology sectors, it is 
not obvious that buyers are a particularly relevant source of information, given that these firms draw 
heavily on academic knowledge and have extensive formal and informal research links to academic 
institutions (Cohen et al., 2002; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Fabrizio, 2009).  
An illustrative example is the biotechnology industry, which has strong links to Open Science. 
Small and medium-sized biotechnology firms often license basic research findings to established 
pharmaceutical firms that have the complementary assets to implement the research inputs to produce 
actual drugs (Powell et al., 1996). In this example, upstream biotechnology R&D is clearly an input to 
downstream R&D, although it is less evident whether this relationship holds in the opposite direction 
(see also Harhoff, 1996). However, given the facilitated possibilities of transferring tacit knowledge in 
supply chain relationships as a result of repeated interactions at the individual level, there is a rationale 
to expect, overall, a positive impact of buyer innovation on supplier innovation. 
H1. Buyer technological innovation has a positive impact on supplier technological innovation. 
 
3.2 Relationship duration 
Firms that engage in transactions may be required to invest in the relationship, and subsequently also 
develop specific assets (Williamson, 1985). More specifically, firms that intend to learn from supply 
chain partners may be required to develop an absorptive capacity that is specific to the relationship (Lane 
and Lubatkin, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998). A supply chain relationship is typically associated with 
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repeated interactions between different individuals, enabling the exchange of valuable tacit knowledge. 
However, as a precondition, the scientists and engineers involved have to get to know one another in 
order to identify who has critical expertise. Moreover, individuals have to develop an understanding as 
to which knowledge can be shared or should remain within the firm (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Powell et 
al., 1996) and they have to use a common language for interaction (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Therefore, 
supply chain partners may benefit from increasing experience and from explicit organizational efforts 
to achieve efficient communication and dedicated coordination with partners (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kotabe et al., 2003). Since the implementation of knowledge sharing routines 
and a relationship-specific absorptive capacity is a cumulative process that evolves over time (see also 
Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991), it can be expected that the relationship 
duration has a positive moderating impact on knowledge spillovers from a buyer to a supplier.  
H2. The impact of buyer technological innovation on supplier technological innovation is positively 
moderated by the duration of the relationship between the supplier and its buyers. 
 
3.3 Technological proximity 
The learning possibilities for a firm are likely not homogeneous across supply chain partners. In the 
previous subsection we identified a firm’s absorptive capacity as a potentially important facilitator of 
knowledge spillovers. Beyond the implementation of routines to increase relation-specific absorptive 
capacity, the basic level of a firm’s absorptive capacity is mainly determined by the overlap in the 
technological portfolios between the focal firm and the external knowledge source (Cohen and Levinthal 
1989, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1998). If the scope of R&D is similar between suppliers and buyers, it 
should require less effort for the supplier to absorb knowledge outcomes from the buyer and to 
recombine them into its own technological outcomes. If a buyer and supplier perform research in the 
same or closely related areas, the R&D personnel of the supplier should be able to more easily recognize 
the complementarities between the supplier’s own knowledge base and the incoming external 
knowledge.  
 In addition to increased absorptive capacity, the innovation activities of closely related buyers 
should be more relevant for the supplier in absolute terms, increasing the “pool” of knowledge that can 
potentially be absorbed. These two mechanisms should lead to higher benefits from knowledge inflows 
when the supply chain partners have a proximate position in the technological space (see also Stuart and 
Podolny, 1996; Jaffe, 1986). It is possible for firms to achieve radical innovations if external, 
technologically distant knowledge is combined with their own knowledge base (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). However, technologically distant knowledge that is relevant for a firm is also more difficult to 
identify and absorb. Therefore, although the prediction is not unambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint, 
we expect a positive moderating effect of the technological proximity between buyers and suppliers.  
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H3. The impact of buyer technological innovation on supplier technological innovation is positively 
moderated by the technological proximity between the supplier and its buyers. 
 
 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Data 
Our analysis relies on a large-scale data set of U.S. firms that combines information from several data 
sources on buyer-supplier relations, financial accounting statements, and patent data. The basic 
empirical context is stock-market listed U.S. firms in high-technology sectors (biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, scientific and medical instruments, aircraft and aerospace, and chemicals). These 
industries are chosen using OECD’s technology intensity definition, which is a classification of 
manufacturing industries based on their average R&D intensity (Hatzichronoglou, 1997). In light of our 
research question, these firms are an ideal setting because of their innovativeness, their dependence on 
continuous knowledge creation, and the importance of formal intellectual property. The latter is also 
important with respect to the empirical strategy that relies on patents as a measure of innovation. The 
industries included are listed in Table 1. 
 
       -- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
 
We combine buyers and suppliers by drawing on a financial accounting standard regarding the 
disclosure of major customers. Paragraph 39 in financial accounting standard 131 stipulates that firms 
must report if revenues from a single customer exceed 10% of total sales (FAS, 1997). Although it is 
not mandatory to report the identity of the customer, most firms do so (and sometimes also do so even 
if sales do not exceed 10% of total sales).  
Since the customers are filed by company name, we use a matching algorithm that takes typos and 
abbreviations into account. For example, for General Motors one can find entries such as GM, General 
Motors Company, G. Motors and G. Mtrs, which have to be matched with a unique company identifier 
such as the CUSIP or ticker codes. After the algorithm-based allocation, the matches are manually 
reviewed. Unfortunately, the matching between customers’ names with Compustat information leads to 
ambiguities (e.g. multiple firms listed in Compustat are allocated) that can partly not be resolved 
manually. In such cases we are restrictive and exclude those observations. Moreover, some firms do not 
report the customer name, or they have government authorities and non-Compustat firms listed as major 
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customers. For the final sample, we extract yearly financial accounting data from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat.2 
This panel of firm-level data is combined with patent data from the Worldwide Patent Statistical 
database (Patstat) using name-based matching procedures. We consider the application date of granted 
patents to capture the period when the knowledge was created. The patent matching is done using a 
matching algorithm that queries the firm names in the applicant field of the Patstat database. Prior to the 
matching, an extensive cleaning and pre-testing of the firm names was carried out. After the matching, 
comprehensive manual checks were performed with a specific focus on firms with high patent/R&D 
ratios and problematic names (as detected in the pre-tests). 
For the final sample, extreme outliers, observations with economically insignificant values (e.g. 
negative sales) and firms with no R&D investment or patenting during the sample period are removed.3 
We also exclude dyads consisting of affiliated firms and subsidiaries. Our final data set contains 
complete information on 230 suppliers between the years 1990 and 2006 (a total of 706 supplier 
observations). The sample period ends in 2006, since we use five years of forward citations as a control 
of patent quality, as outlined in Section 4.2. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the buyers and 
suppliers in our sample. We note that the suppliers in our sample are considerably smaller than the 
buyers. This is because of the accounting standard regarding the disclosure of major customers that is 
used for the data collection. These size differences are helpful for the identification strategy in our 
econometric analysis and will be discussed further in Section 4.3. 
 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
 
 
4.2 Variables 
To test our hypotheses, we include measures that capture the innovation activities of the buyers and 
suppliers, respectively. These include R&D investments and patents. We use patent productivity, Log 
Supp Pat Prod (number of patents, scaled by R&D expenditure to account for differences in input), as 
our core measure of supplier innovation (Hall et al., 2005; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). To capture 
                                                          
2
 The following is an example of the buyer-supplier data structure: In 1990 Megatest Corp. had $75.4 million in 
total sales. It sold $8.7 million (11.5%) to Intel Corp. and $9.3 million (12.3%) to Micron Technology Inc. The 
remaining buyers are not observed. In 1991 we still observe Intel Corp. and Micron Technology Inc. as buyers but 
in addition also Texas Instruments Inc.  
3
 We exclude firms that did not invest in R&D or did not file a patent at all during our sample period. However, it 
is still possible that a firm has no R&D investment or zero patents in a given year. The rationale for excluding 
these firms is to avoid bias by firms with no innovation activities.  
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the absolute size of buyer innovative output potentially absorbed by the supplier, we consider the 
variable Log Buy Pat Count, which denotes the total amount of buyer patents in a given year. We take 
into account that patents are highly skewed in their technological and economic value. In the innovation 
literature, patent forward citations are regarded as an informative quality measure (Jaffe et al., 2000; 
Nelson, 2009; Trajtenberg, 1997). We construct the variable Log Forw Cit Int by counting citations 
within a five-year window starting from the priority date and scaling by patent count. As an additional 
measure, innovative input is measured as R&D scaled by assets, Log RD Int. We include the R&D 
measure for both suppliers and buyers. We take the natural logarithm of all the above variables to reduce 
the effect of outliers.4 We also test joint patents but find only eight cases where the buyer and supplier 
co-patent. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we use the number of years that a buyer and supplier are linked in our data 
set as a measure of the duration (Duration) of the relationship.5 Technological proximity (Tech Prox) is 
measured by determining whether the two firms are in the same industry on different levels of SIC-code 
aggregation (using 2, 3, and 4 digit SIC-codes) (Orlando, 2004). Since not all firms in our sample file 
for patents, applying patent-based proximity measures (e.g. Jaffe 1986) would imply a considerable loss 
of observations. 
In addition to the core measures, we include further controls to take firm heterogeneity into account. 
To account for heterogeneities in firm size we control for the sales of the buying and supplying firms 
(Log Sales). We also include the variable Buyer Count to control for the number of observed buyers in 
a given year in order to capture buyer entry and exit. 
 
4.3 Econometric specification 
Each supplier in our data set is observed over time. At the same time, a supplier can have several buyers 
in a given year, and vice versa. Both buyers and suppliers can enter and exit the panel. Unlike a standard 
two-dimensional panel we therefore potentially have unobserved heterogeneity on both the buyer and 
the supplier dimensions. 
In order not to bias our results by suppliers with many buyers (which would lead to multiple 
observations for a single supplier in a given year), we aggregate our data at the supplier dimension 
(McGahan and Silverman, 2006). For each supplier-year observation we calculate a weighted average 
for each observed buyer characteristic.6 Our data set hence reduces to a standard two-dimensional panel 
                                                          
4
 We make the transformation ln(1+variable) as suggested by Jaffe (1986).  
5
 We acknowledge that this proxy has limitations as the dyad could have existed without being present in the 
data set. 
6
 For example, aggregate buyer sales is the average sales of all buyers connected to the supplier i in year t, weighted 
by the amount of sales between the supplier and each buyer. 
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with unique supplier-year observations. Table 3 shows the correlation between the variables described 
in Section 4.2 after aggregation. 
 
   -- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
 
We estimate the following econometric model: 
Log_Supp_Pat_Prodit =                       (1) 
β0 + β1Log_Buy_Pat_Prodit−1 + β2Durationit + β3 Tech Proxit +  
+ β4Durationit × Log_Buy_Pat_Prodit−1 + β5Tech_Proxit × Log_Buy_Pat_Prodit−1 +  
+ ∑ 

 	

 + Fi + µ t + eit 
 
Where Fi denotes supplier fixed effects, µ t year fixed effects, Xit the set of control variables 
described in Section 4.2 and eit the error term. Like Bloom et al. (2013), we lag the main dependent 
variable, Log Buy Pat Prod, by one year to avoid simultaneity bias and to allow for a time delay in 
potential knowledge spillovers. 
To control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we rely on the “within”-fixed effects 
estimator. Since the estimator only explains variation over time for a given firm, we control for all 
factors that are time invariant such as geographic location, firm culture, industry, and all time-variant 
company characteristics preceding the sample period. There are two sources of within-variation in our 
data: 1) the independent variables of interest can change directly over time (the number of patents 
changes every year for a given buyer) and 2) the buyers that are linked to a supplier enter and exit the 
panel over the years.7 To ensure consistent standard errors we correct for potentially autocorrelated 
residuals by running all regressions with cluster robust standard errors. In addition we use an estimator 
that allows for lag-1 autocorrelated residuals.  
With regard to our econometric analysis, we acknowledge several potential sources of endogeneity. 
The first relates to the possibility that supplier innovation is positively impacting buyer innovation, 
rather than vice versa. Reverse causality may also affect the moderating effect of relationship duration 
as the buyer may prefer to sustain the supply chain relationship with an innovative supplier, resulting in 
longer relationship duration. However, the size differences (between buyers and suppliers in our sample) 
in the dimensions R&D expenditures, patent counts, and firm size should reduce this concern. The 
                                                          
7
 One of our variables of interest, the technological proximity between supplier and buyer, only has one source 
of within-variation. This comes from the entry or exit of buyers over time. 
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suppliers in our sample are considerably smaller than their average buyer, which makes it relatively 
unlikely that a change in their innovative productivity has a significant impact on the innovative output 
of the buyer. Furthermore, we lag the independent variable (Log Buy Pat Count) by one year. Our results 
could also be driven by selection—i.e. we could find evidence of knowledge spillovers from buyers to 
suppliers because innovative buyers tend to work with innovative suppliers. However, this potential 
mechanism should be mitigated by taking the innovativeness and the innovative input of the supplier 
into consideration. By observing the dyads over time and using a fixed effects panel data model, we 
account for the degree of innovativeness of the supplier before it enters our sample (and hence also when 
the selection decision is made). Moreover, by including R&D intensity we control for the innovative 
input in each observed year. Further potential sources of endogeneity may arise from omitted variables 
that are simultaneously correlated with the innovative output of the buyer and the supplier, such as 
technology specific shocks. 
 
5 Results and discussion 
The results of our econometric analysis are shown in Table 4. Our first interest concerns the 
unconditional effect of buyer innovation Log Buy Pat Countt-1 without considering the moderating 
factors, which are reported in columns (1)-(2).  
 
--    Insert Table 4 about here -- 
 
Starting with an OLS model (1), a 1% increase in patents at the buyer, on average, leads to a 
0.0227% increase in patent productivity for the supplier. Taking firm-fixed effects into account (2), the 
magnitude decreases only marginally to 0.0211%. Consequently, we find strong support for Hypothesis 
1. Concerning the R&D intensity of the buyer, we do not detect any significant effects across model 
specifications. However, this is not surprising, since R&D investments reflects the same, or very similar, 
knowledge as our main independent variable and is introduced as intensity measure. 
 Following our discussion in the conceptual part, we examine the influence of the two moderating 
factors as indicated in Hypotheses 2 and 3, namely Duration and Technological Proximity. In models 
(3) and (4) we introduce the corresponding interaction terms separately, before estimating the full 
regression model with both interactions (5). Model (6) expands (5) by allowing for lag-1 autocorrelated 
residuals. When doing so, the observations with only one year of relationship duration are lost by 
construction. The sign and significance levels remain consistent, largely confirming the results of our 
main regression model (5), which are discussed below: 
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The regression results suggest that relationship duration is indeed a relevant moderating factor since 
we find a positive and highly significant interaction term. As one would expect, the duration variable 
has no positive impact as such, but it considerably amplifies the effect of knowledge spillovers. This 
result is in line with the consideration that firms need to build up a relation-specific absorptive capacity 
in order to benefit from technological outcomes of buying firms. To shed more light on the impact of 
the relationship duration, we compute the marginal effects of varying average relationship durations as 
reported in Table 5. Interestingly, buyer technological innovation has little or no impact on suppliers’ 
innovative outcomes during the first year. However, the magnitudes increase over time, and the variable 
becomes statistically significant starting from the second year onwards. From a learning point of view, 
this results suggests that any changes in partners should take into account that firms need considerable 
time before knowledge spillovers can be successfully absorbed.  
 
         -- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
 
Finally, we analyze the technological proximity between the supplier and its buyers, but do not find 
a statistically significant effect. As discussed in Section 3, the theoretical prediction is ambiguous, 
although we would have expected a positive impact overall. This indicates that learning from 
technological outcomes of buyers is possible in terms of both relatively proximate and distant 
knowledge. It is also necessary to keep in mind that there is already an intrinsic selection in terms of 
technological proximity from the formation of the supply chain relationship, which already implies a 
certain proximity. An alternative explanation could lie in the possibility that sector classifications may 
insufficiently capture the overlap in the technological portfolios. Therefore, one has to be cautious in 
drawing far-reaching conclusions based on our results on technological proximity.  
Overall, we provide econometric evidence that buyers are an important source of learning with 
regard to technological innovation. This is an interesting result given that one might expect that 
universities and public research institutions would be more relevant learning sources in high-technology 
sectors. Moreover, our results strongly suggest that building up long-term relationships can be a 
rewarding strategy.  
 
6 Robustness checks 
Our main result—that buyer innovation positively influences supplier innovation—also remains stable 
across numerous alternative specifications (see Table 6). Models (1)-(2) show fixed effects and random 
effects regressions with similar outcomes. To investigate whether suppliers with no patents in a given 
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year might bias our results, we run a Tobit panel regression (model 3). The results remain very similar 
to other specifications, indicating that left-censoring is not masking the true effect. 
 
-- Insert Table 6 about here -- 
 
We also try a different specification without lagging the independent variable Log Buy Pat Count. 
We find that buyer innovation in year t does not significantly impact supplier innovation in year t (model 
4). This would suggest that it takes time for the supplier to absorb and utilize the knowledge. In model 
(5) the control variables are lagged by 1 year showing similar results to model (1). Moreover, we split 
our sample into two groups based on the average size difference between the supplier and its buyers. 
We find a spillover effect for the group with large size differences but no significant effect in the group 
with small size differences (see models 6 & 7). We also estimate two count models (8 & 9) as robustness 
checks. Both the negative binomial and the Poisson panel regressions yield significant and positive 
coefficients. Finally we also test a model where we scale buyer patent count by R&D. The effect remains 
positive and significant. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This study provides novel empirical evidence on knowledge spillovers in supply chains. We analyze 
knowledge spillovers between buyers and suppliers, as well as central factors that govern this 
phenomenon. We find both statistically and economically significant evidence that buyer innovation 
positively influences supplier innovation. We also show that knowledge spillovers from buyers to 
suppliers are positively moderated by the duration of the relationship between the two firms. The results 
do not support the hypothesis that knowledge spillovers increase the more similar a supplier is to its 
buyers in terms of technology. 
 The notion that buyer innovation positively affects supplier innovation and that the relationship 
duration is an important moderating effect offers some interesting insights. Our results provide a 
rationale for supply chain and R&D managers to engage in longer-term relationships as the benefits of 
external knowledge increase over time. Although we cannot directly observe the micro-mechanism 
behind this result, it suggests that the development of a relation-specific absorptive capacity and routines 
for learning is important. This implies that suppliers can benefit from active knowledge management 
and the development of routines, allowing them to accelerate the absorption of relevant buyer 
knowledge. However, firms—in our context the buying firms—should also consider the fact that 
knowledge flows out. While knowledge flows to suppliers can improve the supply chain performance 
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as a whole, the supplier might learn more than what was intended and suppliers may start to compete in 
certain product markets.  
Our study comes with several limitations that future research could try to address. First, our results 
could be driven by endogeneity and selection effects. In particular, unobserved mechanisms relevant for 
the formation and continuation of buyer-supplier relationships could lead to an overestimation of 
spillovers as well as relationship duration as a moderating factor. Similarly, we cannot entirely exclude 
the effect of reverse causality and the fact that supplier innovation also can impact buyer innovation. 
Second, we do not observe the full set of buyers connected to the suppliers in our sample. An assumption 
in our model is therefore that the observed buyers are representative of the whole set. If this assumption 
does not hold, our results could be biased. Third, all buyers and suppliers in our sample are publicly 
traded U.S. firms, which may limit the generalizability of our results. Our sample construction 
intrinsically implies a close geographical (and cultural) proximity compared with global suppliers. 
While such proximity could increase the magnitude of spillovers, knowledge from more distant suppliers 
might also lead to more radical innovations.  
Future research could address these questions by analyzing samples based on plant level (Todo et 
al., 2015) or global sourcing (Jain et al., 2013) data. Although this was beyond the scope of our study, 
future research could also investigate the relative importance of tacit and codified knowledge transfers. 
Admittedly, this is a challenging endeavor, but detailed surveys and case studies could provide 
additional insights. 
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Table 1: Sample composition 
 
 
 
Table 2: Buyer and supplier characteristics before aggregation 
Meta-Sector SIC included Suppliers Buyers
Biotechnology & Pharmaceuticals 2834, 2835, 2836 23 14
Chemicals 2800, 2810, 2820, 2821, 2833 241 470
Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT)
3570, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3576, 3577, 3578, 3579, 3661, 
3663, 3669, 3670, 3672, 3674, 3677, 3678, 3679, 4812, 
4813, 4822
196 477
Aircraft & Aerospace 3721, 3724, 3728 33 67
Navigation, Scientific, Medical, and 
Optical instruments
3812, 3822, 3823, 3824, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 
3842, 3843, 3844, 3845, 3851, 3861 213 289
Sum 706 1 317
Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Buyers
Patents 160.5 41 313.2 0 2448
Forward citations 1090.2 211 2314.2 0 20606
R&D (USD million) 935.9 319.5 1395.3 0.32 12942.2
Sales (USD million) 10,751.2 3078 16,115.3 0.46 97557.7
Suppliers
Patents 10.1 2 40.1 0 669
Forward citations 66.5 8 295.4 0 6,364
R&D (USD million) 61.9 12 242.5 0.002 3,439.8
Sales (USD million) 823.4 33.9 3298.9 0.02 39220.3
Tie Strength 26% 17% 23% 0.001% 100%
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Log Supp Pat Prod 0.22 0.28 1
(2) Log Lagged Buy Pat Count 4.11 2.09 0.045 1
(3) Duration 3.66 2.05 0.051 0.11** 1
(4) Tech Prox 0.33 0.46 0.086* -0.11** -0.052 1
(5) Buyer Count 1.15 0.39 -0.073 0.11** -0.12** -0.037 1
(6) Log Buy Frwd Cit Int 1.72 0.72 -0.12*** 0.40*** -0.086* -0.085* 0.067 1
(7) Log Supp R&D Int 0.16 0.14 -0.10** -0.091* -0.21*** 0.088* 0.16*** -0.088* 1
(8) Log Buy R&D Int 0.08 0.05 0.043 0.086* -0.13*** 0.30*** 0.092* 0.049 0.29*** 1
(9) Log Supp Sales 4.16 2.19 0.0071 0.10** 0.25*** -0.10** -0.16*** 0.11** -0.51*** -0.28*** 1
(10) Log Buy Sales 8.88 1.71 -0.079* 0.52*** 0.12** -0.26*** -0.0046 0.27*** -0.12** -0.26*** 0.35*** 1
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Table 4: Regression outputs 
  
 
 
 
Log Supp Pat Prod (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Buy Pat Count t− 1 0.0227** 0.0211** 0.00646 0.0266*** 0.0116 -0.00852
(0.00923) (0.00859) (0.0112) (0.00889) (0.0115) (0.0166)
Log Buy Pat Count t− 1  x Duration 0.00508*** 0.00503** 0.00917**
(0.00193) (0.00194) (0.00363)
Log Buy Pat Count t− 1  x Tech Prox -0.0150 -0.0138 -0.0310
(0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0304)
Duration -0.00170 -0.00161 -0.0243** -0.00264 -0.0251** -0.0339
(0.00771) (0.00807) (0.00945) (0.00841) (0.00976) (0.0210)
Tech Prox 0.0624 -0.0344 -0.0305 0.0209 0.0203 -0.0490
(0.0525) (0.0784) (0.0800) (0.117) (0.122) (0.120)
Buyer Count -0.0510 -0.0108 -0.00610 -0.0107 -0.00613 0.0121
(0.0313) (0.0240) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0483)
Log Buy Frwd Cit Int -0.0542** -0.00816 -0.00943 -0.00777 -0.00907 -0.0353
(0.0238) (0.0160) (0.0169) (0.0158) (0.0166) (0.0309)
Log Supp R&D Int -0.194 -0.184 -0.181 -0.182 -0.179 -0.219
(0.138) (0.141) (0.138) (0.138) (0.135) (0.202)
Log Buy R&D Int 0.198 0.139 0.0867 0.124 0.0727 -0.0305
(0.308) (0.341) (0.338) (0.335) (0.333) (0.659)
Log Supp Sales 0.0169 -0.00795 -0.00550 -0.00720 -0.00483 -0.00434
(0.0131) (0.0220) (0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0209) (0.0317)
Log Buy Sales -0.00127 -0.00410 -0.00391 -0.00563 -0.00532 -0.0169
(0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0351)
Industry Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Included No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 706 706 706 706 706 476
Suppliers 230 230 230 230 230 156
Within R-Square 0.191† 0.0651 0.0744 0.0662 0.0753 0.121
F Statistic 4.210*** 1.097 1.375 1.227 1.430* 1.772**
(1) Baseline OLS regression. (2) Baseline fixed effects regression. (3)  FE: Interaction between buyer patent count 
and duration. (4) FE: Interaction between buyer patent count and technological  proximity.  (5) Full FE model. (6) 
Full FE model allowing for lag-1 autocorrelated residuals.
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. †OLS R-Square. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Marginal effects of relationship duration over time  
   
 
Table 6: Main coefficients of robustness test regressions 
 
Duration  (years) Log Buy Pat Count t−1
1 0.0121
2 0.0171*
3 0.0221***
4 0.0272***
5 0.0322***
6 0.0372***
7 0.0423***
8 0.0473***
9 0.0523***
10 0.0574***
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The table shows the impact (elasticity) of Log 
Buy Pat Count t−1  on Log Supp Pat Prod  for 
buyer-supplier relationship durations ranging 
from 1 to 10 years.
Specification Description of Robustness Test Buyer Patent Count S.E. N
(1) Fixed effects 0.0212** 0.105 706
(2) Random effects 0.0230*** 0.082 706
(3) Panel-Tobit random effects 0.0231*** 0.101 706
(4) Without lag 0.0158 0.138 1167
(5) With lagged control variables 0.0230** 0.078 706
(6) Subsample: dyads with large size differences 0.0176* 0.142 332
(7) Subsample: dyads with small size differences 0.0213 0.108 374
(8) NB fixed effects count model 0.000645*** 0.085 514
(9) Poisson fixed effects count model 0.000525*** 0.229 514
(10) Fixed effects with buyer patent productivity 0.229*** 0.136 706
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
